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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN A. GEORGEDES, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. ' No. 17073 
BONI A. GEORGEDES, 
Defendant and.Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTI'FF-RESPONDENT 
JOHN A. GEORGEDES 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Decree of Divorce was entered awarding each of the parties 
a Decree of Divorce from the other; awarding plaintiff all home and 
business real property and other business and personal assets; award-
ing defendant certain personal property and restoration of her former 
name. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON.APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court's decision and 
order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent believes the following taken from the trial court's 
Memorandwn Decision and Fi~dings accurately and briefly states the 
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Statement of Facts and the Nature of the Case: 
The parties were married 15 April 1972. "[E]ven though 
the marriage lasted seven years there did not exist in fact the 
usual husband-wife and family association that makes a success-
ful marriage for most of that period of time." (Trial Court 
Record, p. 92, hereinafter "R. 92"). Even though "[t]he Plain-
tiff worked hard and provided a comfortable standard of living 
for the Defendant [over a period of seven years] and made it 
possible for her to continue her education . . . he received 
little in return." (R. 92). 
The court concluded that lack of coramunication may have con-
tributed to this unusual lack of marital relations and therefore 
granted a divorce to both parties. It was not denied that one 
week after the marriage was concluded defendant moved her seven-
year-old son into her bedroom with her and moved her husband 
into the basement. (R. 120). This became his bedroom for the 
duration of the marriage. (R. 121). The evidence also showed 
that even social relations were strained and limited during the 
entire ·marriage and that plaintiff, especially during the last 
three years of the marriage, took most of his meals away from 
home. (R. 121). 
ln·determining the equities relative to distribution of 
assets the court concluded "the Defendant has an annual income 
of Nine Thousand ($9,000.00) Dollars per year [She teaches at 
the College] . . . plus she receives Three Hundred Sixty Eight 
($368.00) Dollars per month for the support of her fifteen (15) 
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year old son and from which she is entitled to a contribution 
for his share of food and household and transportation expense." 
(This is Social Security for defendant's son by a prior marriage) 
(R. 93). Defendant's child is also the owner and beneficiary 
of a Trustee Passbook Savings Account as the result of an award 
by the Industrial Connnission of Utah as a lump sum settlement 
awarded for the death of his father. 
During the marriage plaintiff paid regularly to the defendant 
$600.00 a month plus paying all the utilities and other incidental 
expenses. The defendant instead of using the money provided by 
social security banked it, together with a substantial portion 
of the support paid her by plaintiff, so that she accumulated 
assets during the marriage in excess of $25,000. This accumu-
lation was "made possible only. as· a result of the marriage." 
(R. 123). She also purchased an interest in property in Joe's 
Valley in the name of her son fer which she paid $4,500.00. 
The income of plaintiff in 1978 shows $11,000 with an ex-
pected income in 1979 of the same amount. ·~' [H] e is required to 
pay under a prior Divorce Decree . . . Four Thousand One Hundred 
Sixty-Eight and 80/100 ($4,068.80) Dollars per year leaving him 
. . . for his necessities . approximately Five Hundred 
Seventy ($570.00) Dollars per month to live on. The business 
operated by the Plaintiff does not produce enough income to 
meet the monthly debts and obligations owed by the Plaintiff and 
he keeps the business operating because his father does not demand 
prompt payment of the obligations owed to him for the purchase of 
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thebusiness which means in effect that Plaintiff is operating 
the business purely out of charity shown by his father." (R. 93). 
Because of the foregoing findings, the court concluded that the 
defendant was not entitled to alimony or attorney fees. 
At the time of the marriage plaintiff was the owner of real 
estate and a cleaning business. "[T]he business and property 
. . . carried an indebtedness of approximately Fifty Two Thousand 
.($52,000.00) Dollars .... " (R. 94). At the time of the 
divorce the same business and property carried an indebtedness 
of $110,000.00. (R. 94). While the court recognized that the 
real property could have increased in value because of inflation 
he concluded "there is no evidence . . . of any increase in net 
worth that is not offset by the increase in indebtedness." 
(R. 94). Further, "The evidence shows that the business has 
little value from an income standpoint and remains open purely 
as a result of the charity of the Plaintiff's father." (R. 94). 
At the time of trial plaintiff was indebted to banks, his 
father, and his former wife in the sum of $123,446.20, an in-
crease of about $30,000 since his marriage in 1972. (R. 122). 
The personal property was disposed of by giving defendant 
and plaintiff itemized personal property which neither party 
appears to seriously challenge. 
The principal objection of defendant goes to the court's 
awarding all the real estate and the business (o'Wl1ed by plain-
tiff at the time of marriage) to plaintiff and refusing to grant 
defendant attorney fees or alimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH BROAD DISCRETION TO 
DETERMINE THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES TO A DIVORCE DECREE, 
AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL BE OVERTURNED 
ONLY IF SERIOUS INEQUITY HAS RESULTED FROM AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1979 Supp.) reads, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may 
make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable. 
In making its order pursuant to a divorce decree, the trial court 
has "considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting financial 
\ 
and property interests." English v. Engli.sh, 565 P. 2d 409, 410 
(Utah 1977). The trial court's decision will be overturned only 
where the trial court has clearly.misunderstood or misapplied 
the law, resulting in substantial or prejudicial error; or where 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court's 
decision; or where such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. 
II. THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS 
CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IS ON THE APPELLANT. 
The trial court's order pursuant to a divorce decree is 
invested with a presumption of validity. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). On appeal from the trial court's de-
cision, the burden is on the appellant to prove that the evi-
dence clearly preponderates against the trial court's findings; 
that the trial court misunderstood or misapplied the law result-
ing in substantial and prejudicial error; or that such a serious 
• 
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inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion 
by the trial court. Id. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
MAKING ITS DECISION AND ORDER IN THIS CASE. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE NATURE 
OF .THE MARRIAGE IN MAKING ITS DECISION. 
In Point II of her brief, defendant claims that the trial 
court ignored the parties' marriage in making its award. The 
trial court in fact recognized the parties' lawful marriage. 
(R. 92). However, the court in its discretion took into account 
the nature of the marriage, along with all other relevant fac-
tors, in arriving at its decision. The nature of the parties' 
marriage "as far as the conduct of the parties was concerned [was] 
one of relative short duration." (R. 92). (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff supported defendant to the best of his ability and 
helped to finance her education, but the court acknowledged and 
properly considered the fact that the relationship between the 
parties was different from normal family relationships, and that 
the parties enjoyed a relatively short period of normal marital 
relations. 
In support of her argument, defendant cites Engish v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). That case held that the trial 
court had improperly considered the long duration of the marriage 
in fixing alimony, and the alimony award was cut in half. In 
Barrett v. Barrett, 17 Utah 2d 1, 403 P.2d 649, 651 (1965), on 
the other hand, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the 
marriage of the parties in the case '' ... was a misadventure . . 
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and was of comparatively short duration." On that basis the 
Court reduced the duration of the trial court's alimony award. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that 
despite its apparent statement to the contrary in English v. 
English, supra, " ... the duration of the marriage is an 
appropriate factor to be considered in awarding alimony, . 
Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453, 455 n. 1 (Utah 1978). 
In the present case, the trial court properly considered 
not only the type of relationship the parties had during their 
marriage, but also the financial condition_ of the parties and 
their current and prospective financial needs. The trial court 
had all of the facts presented to it to consider in making its 
alimony award, and thus was in a unique position to determine 
the conditions and needs of the parties and the way in which 
their marital relationship had affected those conditions and 
needs. This Court should uphold the trial court's decision 
based on the trial court's discretion to consider all relevant 
facts. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE PARTIES' 
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS IN MAKING ITS PROPERTY AND 
ALIMONY AWARDS. 
In Points III and IV of her brief, the defendant claims 
that the trial court improperly considered the savings account 
set up for defendant's child and the financial status of plain-
tiff in making its property division and alimony award. In so 
arguing the defendant ignores the main purpose of alimony, which 
is "to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
" 
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standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent 
the wife from becoming a public charge." English v. English, 565 
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). The criteria to be used in making 
this determination include the wife's financial condition and 
needs, her ability to earn a sufficient income, and the husband's 
ability to provide support. English v. English, supra, 565 P.2d 
at 411-412. A review of the trial court's decision in this case 
reveals that the trial court properly exercised its discretion 
in disallowing alimony. 
The defendant states that the plaintiff supported defendant 
with payments of $600.00 per month during most of their marriage 
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 12). The trial court found that the de-
fendant now has a net monthly income of $600.00, in addition to 
the $368.00 per month she receives for the support of her son, 
for a total of $938.00. (R. 93). The trial court also found 
that the plaintiff has a net monthly income of $570.00. (R. 93). 
Clearly the defendant is in no danger of becoming a "public 
charge." Furthermore, the defendant is able to support herself 
at a standard of living at least equal to that which she enjoyed 
during the marriage, and the plaintiff's ability to provide sup-
port is severely limited, if not nonexistent. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1979), the trial 
court is given the power to make awards pursuant to a divorce 
decree ''as may be equitable." The trial court exercised its 
discretion in this case by considering the parties' financial 
conditions, needs, and abilities in making its award. It was 
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proper for the trial court to consider all of the assets avail-
able to each of the parties in analyzing the relative financial 
positions of the parties. The purpose of awards pursuant to a 
divorce decree is not to punish either of the parties, but rather 
to assure that each of the parties is as well provided for as 
can equitably be ordPred. The trial court accomplished that pur-
pose in this c~se. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT VJ.ADE A PROPER DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
In Point II of her brief, the defendant argues that the 
trial court disregarded her joint tenancy interest in one of the 
businesses and in the parties' home in awarding the home and the 
business to the plaintiff. The fact that the defendant may have 
legally owned an interest in the home and business is irrelevant 
to the trial court's power to divide the property as it may deem 
equitable. Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1979), "the 
Court may make such orders in relation to . . . property and 
parties . as may be equitable." The trial court recognized 
the· nature of the defendant's interests in the property, and made 
its award on the basis of the evidence before it. 
The defendant goes on to argue at length that the trial 
court's division of property was no~ in agreement with some of 
the evidence. However, the issue now before this Court is not 
whether the trial court's decision is in complete agreement 
with each part of the evidence, but whether the decision has 
resulted in such a serious inequity as to indicate a clear abuse 
n 
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of discretion by the trial court. English v. English, 565 P.2d 
409 (Utah 1977). The defendant now attempts to overturn the 
trial court's decision on the basis of the defendant's own ap-
praisal of the home and the 11apparent equity" in the laundry 
business (Defendant's brief, pp. 7-8). The trial court found 
that the home and business had realized little, if any, appreciable 
increases in value.(R. 121). Furthermore, the trial court found 
that the plai.ntiff 's total indebtedness at the time of trial was 
approximately $123,446.29, an increase of about $30,000.00 from 
the beginning of the marriage. (R. 122). 
The trial court was in a unique position to judge the quantity, -
quality, and validity of the evidence presented to it regarding 
the value of the property to be divided between the parties. 
It is clear that the parties' relationship during their marriage 
was not typical of marital relationships; that the plaintiff 
supported the defendant as well as could have been expected 
during the unusual and strained marital relationship; and that the 
defendant is now in a financial position as good as (if not bet-
ter than) that of the plaintiff. The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding the home and business to the plain-
tiff, and the award has not resulted in a serious inequity. The 
trial court's property award should be upheld. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT 
Unde·r Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1953), the trial court may 
require a party to a divorce proceeding to pay to the other 
party a sum of money to enable the other party to prosecute or 
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defend the action.· In Weiss v. Weiss, 111 U. 353, 179 P.2d 
1005, 1011 (1947), this Court interpreted that statute to permit 
awards of attorney's fees, "provided the necessity for such awards 
is found to exist.'' Thus the issue once again is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in such a way as to result in 
a serious inequity by failing to require that the plaintiff pay 
the defendant's attorney's fees. 
The trial court stated that the purpose of the statute is 
to assure that ne~ther party is denied access to court because 
of inability to pay legal fees, and found that the defendant 
had not demonstrated an ability to pay legal fees. (R. 96). 
The defendant now claims that the trial court's award of the 
"income producing assets of the marriage" to the plaintiff left 
the defendant with no way to pay her attorney (Defendant's brief, 
p. 14). This is in direct contradiction to the trial court's 
finding that the property awarded to the palintiff has little, 
if any, income-producing capacity. (R. 121). Furthermore, the 
trial court found that the defendant now has a monthly income 
of $600.00 in addition to $368.00 per month for child support 
from a prior marriage. (R. 93)o The defendant's claim that she 
is unable to pay her attorney is without factual basis, and the 
trial court's decision not to require plaintiff to pay defen-
dant's attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The defendant originally moved for a new trial on the basis 
of surprise and inadequate damages. (R. 98). The defendant now 
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urges more specifically that the trial court was biased (De-
fendant' s brief, p. 14). Regardless of the basis for the motion, ·' 
the question of whether a new trial will be granted is .within the .. 
broad discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's re-
fusal to grant a new trial will be overturned on appeal only if 
the trial court abused its discretion. Crellin v. Thomas, 122 
U. 122, 247 P,2d 264 (1952). The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in this case. 
The first basis for defendant's motion was surprise, in that 
the defendant was unaware of a fund set up for the use of de-
fendant's minor child by the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
Defendant's motion was supported by an affidavit of her attorney 
stating that she had "simply forgotten about it." (R. 108). 
Furthermore, the fund is of little relevance to the case because, 
apart from the Industrial Commission fund, defendant is earning 
about $600.00 per month in addition to a $368.00 monthly support 
payment for her child. Thus the supposedly newly discovered evi-
den~e is not such "substantial material evidence, from which it 
appears there is at least a reasonable likelihood that it would 
affect the result in a new trial." Crellin v. Thomas, supra, 
247 P.2d at 265. 
The defendant has also based h~r appeal of the trial court's 
refusal to grant a new trial on several grounds not brought be-
fore the trial court, such as the trial court's setting of the. 
trial date and several allegedly improper procedural matters. 
(Defendant's bri.ef, pp. 15-16). The Supreme Court is limited in 
... 
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its review of defendant's motion to the matters before the trial 
court, and will not consider matters brought for the first time 
before the Supreme Court. Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 
P.2d 430 (1970). The plaintiff has already rebutted the grounds 
alleged in defendant's original motion in plaintiff's Answer to 
Motion for New Trial. (R. 129-135). The new grounds alleged 
are not properly before this Court. The trial court determined 
in its broad discretion that defendant's allegations were insuf-
ficient to require a new trial. The trial court did not abuse 
that discretion, and its decision should not now be overturned. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
The issue before the Court is whether the trial court in 
this case abused its discretion in making its award of property 
and alimony, causing a serious inequity to the defendant. The 
preceding discussion demonstrates that the parties had an unusual 
marital relationship. The plaintiff supported the defendant 
regularly during the marriage and helped to finance the defendant's 
education, despite the plaintiff's lack of a substantial income. 
The defendant now has a substantial income, supplemented by a 
monthly social security payment for the support of her child, 
and the plaintiff is earning a subsistence-level income. To 
require now that the plaintiff pay part of his limited income to 
the defendant as alimony would be to penalize the plaintiff and 
to award a windfall to the defendant. The trial court made its 
award and property division on the basis of all of the facts 
before it. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The 
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plaintiff, therefore, requests that this Court affirm the deci-
sion of the trial court. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~ 
Thera d N. ensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
190 North Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
Cl~- 'xi d / . Ashton 
Att rney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Suite 1600, 50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah ·84144 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of September, 1980, 
I mailed two true copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENT to the attorney for the defendant-appellant herein, 
Geo~ge H. Speciale, Attorney at Law, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, by mailing saidcopi?s through the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid. 
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